Kenan Malik on gay marriage and Catholic ‘persecution’

British writer and broadcaster Kenan Malik has written a blog post about the recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights to dismiss three cases of supposed discrimination against Christians, and the larger issue of religious freedom versus equality laws. Malik’s post addresses the argument by Catholics that the legalisation of gay marriage is effectively an act of persecution against them, since it would “severely [restrict] the ability of Catholics to teach the truth about marriage in their schools, charitable institutions or places of worship”. It’s the same tired refrain from religionists: taking away their right to discriminate on unreasonable grounds is an act of persecution, and contrary to the spirit of religious freedom. These claims, as Malik writes, “not only fundamentally misunderstand religious freedom, but, in their wild hysteria, serve also to undermine those very freedoms.”

Malik’s post is eminently quotable; here’s his response to the argument that gay marriage is a uniquely oppressive example of Catholic ‘persecution’:

There are many laws that liberal societies enact that are contrary to the beliefs and practices of many religions. The legalization of abortion, for instance, of homosexuality, and of divorce (and the acceptance that divorcees can remarry) – all legally permit practices condemned by the Catholic Church (and by many other faiths). Are these also expressions of the ‘persecution’ of believers? If not, why should the legalization of gay marriage be so different?

And here Malik shows why legalising gay marriage actually extends, not restricts, freedom of religion (emphasis Malik’s):

The claim that legalizing gay marriage undermines freedom of religion has it back to front. Legalizing gay marriage in reality extends freedom of religion. While most faiths oppose gay marriage, some support it and would like to consecrate same-sex unions. They are, however, forbidden from doing so by the law. Adherents of such faiths are, in other words, legally prohibited from following their conscience. In permitting such congregations formally to bless same-sex unions, any law legalizing gay marriage would extend freedom of religion.

As for the scaremongering by Catholics where they claim that equality laws would force them to perform same-sex marriages against their beliefs, Malik rebuts:

If legislation for gay marriage does lead to unacceptable infringements upon religious freedom, then we – secular and religious – should contest any such infringements. But the fact that injustice may be done to believers in the future is no reason to prevent justice being done to gays and lesbians today.

What about the claim that legalising same-sex marriage would prevent Catholics from teaching “the truth about marriage in their schools, charitable institutions or places of worship”? Malik writes:

[T]he issue of gay marriage is not fundamentally different from many other cases in which religious ‘truth’ diverges from that which the law permits or proscribes. The fact that abortion, contraception, homosexuality and divorce are all legal in Britain has not prevented Catholic priests or teachers from asserting their ‘truth’ on these issues, or barred them from entering any profession.

Finally, Malik expresses the gist of secularist arguments against religious privilege (not religious freedom).

[Catholics] have every right to believe [that marriage is between a man and a woman], to publicly express that belief and to act upon it by refusing to countenance same-sex unions within their church. What they do not have the right to do is to insist that if anyone else thinks differently, and wishes to act upon their belief, they are in so doing persecuting Catholics and attacking religious freedom, and that therefore such beliefs must not be acted upon. Religious freedom is important; too important to leave it be traduced in such cavalier fashion by particular interest groups.

21.1.13

Is eugenics really such a bad thing?

Kenan Malik is a critic of a purely science-based morality, the sort promoted by thinkers like Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape (2010). Malik doesn’t believe that ethical issues are amenable to scientific reductionism. In his review of The Moral Landscape, he makes this criticism of Harris’s ideal morality:

Moral norms seem not to emerge through a process of social engagement and collective conversation, nor in the course of self-improvement, but rather are laws to be revealed from on high [by science] and imposed upon those below.

Malik recently wrote a blog post expanding on his analogy of scientific morality as revealed laws (the religious connotation is made obvious in the title of his post). Again, he challenges the assumptions of those like Harris who view morality as simply being a question of facts, which science can discover and present, indisputable. Malik mentions the bioethicist Julian Savulescu, who has argued in favour of a benign form of eugenics that will remove the “genes and proteins associated with poor impulse control as well as those for psychopathy and anti-social personality disorder” while promoting “genes for compassion and moral thinking.”

So far, so controversial.

I am inclined to adopt the scientific view of morality as espoused by Harris and Savulescu, though it is to Malik’s credit that his counter-arguments have made me reexamine my position, if not entirely abandon it. I think that when one accepts a materialist conception of human personality (or the mind), one has to also accept that neurobiological manipulation can alter people's character traits. So why not do so to make them more moral?

Malik rebuts Savulescu’s idea of positive eugenics with examples of how nominally bad traits like aggression can be good in the right context, and vice-versa for nominally good traits like trust and co-operation. He writes:

But is it a good that trust be enhanced in all circumstances? After all, would not authoritarian regimes and even democratic politicians welcome a more trustful, and therefore a less questioning, population? Is aggression always bad? Is the aggression that the Arab masses have shown, and continue to show, in taking to the streets in defiance of brutal authoritarian regimes equivalent to the aggression of those authorities in brutalising and murdering the protestors? And if not does it make any sense to suggest, as Savulescu does, that ‘our futures may depend upon making ourselves wiser and less aggressive’, including through the ‘compulsory’ use of serotonin [a neurotransmitter that contributes to feelings of happiness and well-being]?

Good points. But as I responded in a comment to Malik’s post, what about undeniably pernicious traits like a propensity for sexual predation or rape? For violent psychopathy or homicidal urges? I wrote:

If one accepted a materialist conception of the mind, then wouldn’t it be an uncontroversial good to use medical/scientific means to purge these sorts of tendencies from people? And if you answer “no”, what would be the moral justification for letting a portion of society continually pose a (perhaps fatal) risk to others?

Malik replied that my question was an important one that “gets to the heart of the debate about what we mean by a ‘materialist view of the mind’”, and that he will write a proper post on this topic soon, hopefully within the next few days. I look forward to his (very likely persuasive) answer to the rather utilitarian dilemma my question poses. Stay tuned!

11.7.12

Two talks on blasphemy and free speech

Last Saturday the Centre for Inquiry UK held a conference in London on “the criminalization of religious hatred, defamation, and insult under European human rights, and how this functions as a de facto blasphemy law”. The event, aptly named ‘Blasphemy!’, featured two intellectuals who I admire – writer and broadcaster Kenan Malik, and human rights activist Maryam Namazie. They each gave a speech at the conference, and have posted transcripts on their respective blogs. Their talks focused on different issues (though with some overlap) while showing their distinctive communication styles.

Malik talked about, among other things, the connection between the concept of blasphemy and the retention of power by individuals with a vested interest in taking offense when their beliefs and values are challenged or criticised. He laid out in detail the historical, political and social context in which current controversies surrounding blasphemous cartoons and literature are playing out, and argued his case in his usual measured yet sharply critical way.

Namazie spoke passionately on how charges of blasphemy/offense and ‘Islamophobia’ act as “secular fatwas”, their purpose being to silence dissent and curtail free speech. Her talk also touched on the cartoon controversy, with her fierce criticisms mainly directed at the misplaced political correctness of those who sought to censor the cartoons out of ‘respect’ for Muslims. Namazie is more truculent than Malik in her approach, but her arguments are no less valid for that.

I’m with them both on this. Malik’s deep contextual knowledge and Namazie’s righteous anger make a powerful combination. Those of us who treasure freedom of expression and detest religious tyranny are fortunate to have these two champions batting for our team.




30.1.12

The misconceptions of ‘cultural’ Christianity

Two recent events have brought into focus the idea of Christianity being the cultural bedrock of Western civilisation. The first is the Norway massacre carried out by Anders Behring Breivik, and the second is the ‘Mark No Religion’ campaign conducted in the lead up to the Australian 2011 census just past. The concept of ‘cultural’ Christianity laid at the heart of both events; Breivik was not religious, yet saw himself as defending Europe’s ‘cultural Christendom’ against Muslim invaders, while the ‘Mark No Religion’ census campaign sought to educate Australians on the distinction between being a follower of the Christian faith, and being an irreligious member of a Christian-influenced culture.

This idea of a cultural Christianity inseparable from Western identity and values contains several errors. Kenan Malik has written an informative article that spells out what these errors are. I summarise it below:

Nothing new under the sun

There’s been a lot of commentary, explanation, interpretation, rationalisation, condemnation and justification going on regarding the UK riots. To pick only a tiny sample, there’s writer and cultural critic Kenan Malik’s take (it’s largely the fault of the Right), and there’s The Economist’s (it’s a bit more complicated than that). The New Humanist calls bullshit on the more ludicrous examples of the post hoc discourse, while the Heresiarch cheekily exposes the absurdity of all the post hoc discourse.

Here’s a typical censure of out-of-control hooligans:

What is happening to our young people? They disrespect their elders, they disobey their parents. They ignore the law. They riot in the streets inflamed with wild notions. Their morals are decaying. What is to become of them?

A Tory politician wagging a stern finger at British youthdom? A baby-boomer lamenting the dusk of good manners and personal responsibility? A conservative newspaper columnist asking hard, discomfiting questions?

No, it’s Plato having a gripe in the Athens agora circa 4th century BC.

Some things never change.




18.8.11

Personal bias: the blind spot of science

Science is indisputably the best tool for us to acquire knowledge about reality, both its contents and mechanisms. Science’s efficacy is its own validation; whether through technology or new insight into the true nature of things, our lives are tangibly affected by the processes and products of science. This is an observation that only a die-hard po-mo theorist or committed supernaturalist would challenge.

But this acknowledgement of science’s preeminence as a path to truth does not mean that science is flawless. Science is carried out by people, and people are not perfect. The subjective beliefs of scientists can, unfortunately, contaminate the objective purity of the scientific process. A recent paper published in the journal PLoS Biology, ‘The Mismeasure of Science: Stephen Jay Gould versus Samuel George Morton on Skulls and Bias’, by Jason Lewis et al, reveals how an eminent scientist, in his attempt to debunk the work of another scientist as being tainted by personal prejudice, ironically succumbs to personal prejudices of his own.

In his 1981 book The Mismeasure of Man, the late paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould set out to discredit the ideas of race and intelligence that he found appallingly bigoted and incorrect. Gould’s primary target was the 19th century racial scientist Samuel George Morton, who enjoyed a great reputation in his time for his somewhat macabre studies of the differences – chiefly in intelligence – between ‘races’. In his book, Gould essentially accused Morton of fudging the data he collected from measuring various skulls collected from all over the world in order to ‘prove’ that Europeans were naturally more intelligent than non-Europeans. Gould argued that Morton manipulated the data to arrive at conclusions about European intellectual superiority that the racial scientist already had in mind from the outset.

Two maladies infecting the Japan disasters

Popular perception of the Japanese disasters and the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis is afflicted with two common maladies: media sensationalism, and anti-modern admonishments against human hubris (because supposedly it was pride in our technological prowess that brought us low). Against these twin poisons, Kenan Malik’s article is the antidote. Malik makes the distinction between two catastrophes: the physical one in Japan, and the mental one fabricated by the media. It is the second ‘catastrophe’ that is infected with the aforementioned maladies.

Worried about Egypt’s future

The night shift security guard at my work was born and raised in Egypt. He’s now an Australian citizen. Most nights he drops by the lab during his rounds for a chat, usually just as I’m finishing up for the day. Naturally, last night’s topic was the Egyptian protests. A few months ago he had gone back to Cairo to get married. His wife is still there and he’s worried. “I told her on the phone to not go outside unless she really has to.”

For many Egyptians (and foreign observers), the thought of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood seizing power from Hosni Mubarak’s despised government is a scary one. Especially for minorities like my security guard friend’s family, who are Coptic Christians. My friend is adamant that if the Brotherhood are in government, Copts like him and his family will be persecuted. “There will be blood.”

His melodrama is understandable. His fear is nothing to be made light of, especially by an outsider like me. “But maybe”, I tried to reassure him, “maybe the moderates in the Brotherhood will keep the extremists in check.” After all, I argued, if they come into power, they’re not going to jeopardise their victory by angering the secularists with brutal acts of oppression. I also mentioned Turkey as an example of a country with a mildly Islamist government that is popular with the people yet has freedom of religion.

My friend’s response was dismissive of the Muslim Brotherhood’s benevolence, and pessimistic about religious freedom should they be calling the shots. He didn’t say it, but perhaps he felt that Egypt under the Brotherhood would be more like post-Islamic Revolution Iran, not Turkey.

Now that’s a scary thought.

In a Guardian article, Kenan Malik sketches Egypt’s tumultuous history of dealing with Islamists, describing how its leaders have used and abused Muslim radicals for political gain, with often violent results. The West has been complicit in all of this of course. For decades Western foreign policy with regards to the Muslim world has taken this cynical formula: support secular dictators and Islamists if it means stability and profits, oppose them otherwise.

But Malik expresses what reasonable liberals have always known; democracy may be a messy, factious and unstable system, but that’s how it’s supposed to be. To impose order on this healthy chaos, whether by secular or religious means, is to pervert the democratic spirit, chiefly because this imposition is top-down, while democracy is by definition bottom-up. And if the people decide that Islamists, whether the AKP in Turkey, Hamas in Palestine or the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, should govern them, then as much as it galls liberal secular humanists like myself, it is their right to elect such a government.

I hope the Egyptian people will give themselves a government, secular or religious, that meets their needs, respects their rights and upholds their freedoms. May they reach this positive milestone with minimum violence and bloodshed.




1.2.11

The Pope is wrong (and also right)

In the latest issue of Standpoint magazine (Sep 2010), George Weigel argues that the UK should welcome Pope Benedict XVI when he graces its fair isles next month on a state visit (‘Britain Can Benefit From Benedict’). There is a rather vocal minority who are not too pleased about this, given the Vatican’s perceived complicity in child abuse scandals involving Catholic priests, among other egregious misdeeds. But even without this albatross around his neck, the Pope can expect little warmth from rational folks who see him as the representative of an ossified institution that claims to have unique access to eternal truths and moral laws dictated by a supernatural agency.