Kenan Malik is a critic of a purely science-based morality,
the sort promoted by thinkers like Sam Harris in his book
The Moral Landscape (2010). Malik doesn’t believe that ethical issues are amenable to
scientific reductionism. In his
review of
The Moral Landscape,
he makes this criticism of Harris’s ideal morality:
Moral norms seem not to emerge through a
process of social engagement and collective conversation, nor in the course of
self-improvement, but rather are laws to be revealed from on high [by science]
and imposed upon those below.
Malik recently wrote a
blog post expanding on his analogy of
scientific morality as revealed laws (the religious connotation is made obvious
in the title of his post). Again, he challenges the assumptions of those like
Harris who view morality as simply being a question of
facts,
which science can discover and present, indisputable. Malik mentions the
bioethicist Julian Savulescu, who has argued in favour of a
benign form of eugenics that will remove the “genes and proteins associated with poor impulse
control as well as those for psychopathy and anti-social personality disorder”
while promoting “genes for compassion and moral thinking.”
So far, so controversial.
I am inclined to adopt the scientific view of morality as espoused
by Harris and Savulescu, though it is to Malik’s credit that his
counter-arguments have made me reexamine my position, if not entirely abandon it. I think that when one accepts
a materialist conception of human personality (or the mind), one has to also accept
that neurobiological manipulation can alter people's character traits. So why
not do so to make them more moral?
Malik rebuts Savulescu’s idea of positive eugenics with
examples of how nominally bad traits like aggression can be good in the right
context, and vice-versa for nominally good traits like trust and co-operation.
He writes:
But is it a good that trust be enhanced in
all circumstances? After all, would not authoritarian regimes and even
democratic politicians welcome a more trustful, and therefore a less
questioning, population? Is aggression always bad? Is the aggression that
the Arab masses have shown, and continue to show, in taking to the streets in
defiance of brutal authoritarian regimes equivalent to the aggression of
those authorities in brutalising and murdering the protestors? And if not
does it make any sense to suggest, as Savulescu does, that ‘our futures may
depend upon making ourselves wiser and less aggressive’, including through the ‘compulsory’
use of serotonin [a neurotransmitter that contributes to feelings of happiness and well-being]?
Good points. But as I responded in a comment to Malik’s
post, what about undeniably pernicious traits like a propensity for sexual
predation or rape? For violent psychopathy or homicidal urges? I wrote:
If one accepted a materialist conception
of the mind, then wouldn’t it be an uncontroversial good to use
medical/scientific means to purge these sorts of tendencies from people? And if
you answer “no”, what would be the moral justification for letting a portion of
society continually pose a (perhaps fatal) risk to others?
Malik replied that my question was an important one that “gets
to the heart of the debate about what we mean by a ‘materialist view of the
mind’”, and that he will write a proper post on this topic soon, hopefully
within the next few days. I look forward to his (very likely persuasive) answer
to the rather utilitarian dilemma my question poses. Stay tuned!
11.7.12